This pa per has two parts. The first pres ents a sum mary of the left phenomenological cri tique of le gal pos i tiv ism, as de vel oped by one tendency within crit i cal le gal stud ies. The sec ond at tempts to clar ify the po si tion through a re sponse to one of the many misreadings of the Cls po si tion that are cur rent in the posi tiv ist and post-posi tiv ist mainstream of Unitedstatesean ac a demic le gal phi los o phy.
same time, it seems to mean that the op er a tion is "cog ni tive" in the sense that we un der stand it to be a judg ment about a mean ing, un der stood to be some thing that is in de pend ent of the ob server, and with re spect to which we be lieve there is a "truth of the mat ter," even if in ter pret ers are likely to dis agree about what that truth is.
I don't think eit her of them thought this ma de a lot of dif fe ren ce, but in what fo llows I will ar gue that they we re wrong.
For both au thors, the de ter mi nate op er a tion is not problematized. They char ac ter ize it as though the cog ni tion of a cor rect mean ing for the core or frame, or the highly pre dict able choice of in ter pre ta tion, were automatic and ef fort less, sup pos ing good faith. For Hart it is the application of a norm to a case whose (le gally es tab lished facts) bring it within the core of the norm's mean ing. For Kelsen, it is the re fusal of an in ter pre ta tion of the norm that would lie out side the frame de lim it ing the pos si ble mean ings of the norm.
In other words, when the judge ap plies the rule about ve hi cles in the park to an au to mo bile be ing driven through the park, the rule as ap plied is de ter mi nate. When the Kelsenian in ter preter claims that there is a gap, it is, says Kelsen, usu ally the case that "in fact" there is merely a ten sion be tween a val idly es tab lished norm of no li a bil ity for the de fen dant, as it applies to the case in hand, and the pol i tics of the in ter preter. Here a deter mi nate norm is be ing given a wrong in ter pre ta tion, one out side of the frame de fin ing the pos si ble mean ings of the norm.
One of the most strik ing and pe cu liar as pects of the Hart/Kelsen theory of in ter pre ta tion is that it seems to be a ver sion of "exegese", or "liter al ism". In other words, H/K are ex plain ing how in ter pre ta tion works when there is a sin gle norm that ei ther does or does not make the de fendant li a ble to the plain tiff given the facts of the case. Sur pris ingly enough, nei ther ad dresses one way or an other the in ter pre tive prac tice that seem most char ac ter is tic of their own pe riod of Eu ro pean le gal history, namely in ter pre ta tion us ing the method of "con struc tions" or "coherence" or "con cep tual ju ris pru dence". We can dis tin guish this method from lit er al ism as fol lows.
Con cep tual ju ris pru dence ac cepts that there will be sit u a tions in which there is more than one valid norm (sec tion of the code or bind ing pre cedent) that is ar gu ably ap pli ca ble to the facts, and that dif fer ent norms will give dif fer ent out comes for the case. Con cep tual ju rists (and their crit ics, e. g., Geny in Methode) have also have tended to be lieve that there are sit u a tions that are "new" in the spe cific sense that no valid le gal norm was spe cif i cally in tended to de ter mine them one way or an other. The method re quires the judge to deal both with con flicts and with gaps as follows: he is to pre sup pose the co her ence of "the sys tem" as a whole, and then to ask which of the con flict ing norms, or what new norm, made applica ble to the case, "fits" best with closely re lated norms, and if this is not clear, with the more ab stract norms, ex plicit or im plicit in "the sys tem", from which the par tic u lar norms are un der stood to de rive (Savigny).
From the point of view of H/K, the op er a tion of "con struc tion" through which a con cep tual ju rist deals with the con flict or gap is discretionary and "leg is la tive". But what counts for us is that be fore the construction be gins, there has al ready been a judg ment, not the o rized, that the gap or con flict "ex ists". This, in prac tice, is treated as a cognition of the in ter preter, but un like the con cep tual ju rist's highly self-conscious op er a tion of con struc tion, in which in duc tion and deduction supposedly guar an tee the ob jec tive va lid ity of the choice of norm, the ini tial fram ing of the sit u a tion as con flict or gap is not the orized.
Along with lit er al ism and con cep tual ju ris pru dence, the third method of interpretation of le gal norms that is cur rent in the West ern le gal domain is pol icy anal y sis, or the method of bal anc ing or pro por tion al ity. Here, the in ter preter un der stands him self to have a choice be tween norms or be tween for mu la tions of the norm, a choice that is re solved by ap peal to the con flict ing con sid er ations that he un der stands to un der lie the norm sys tem as a whole. There are many vari ants of the method of pol icy anal y sis. What is bal anced might be con flict ing rights, prin ci ples, or in stru men tal goals sup pos edly of com mon in ter est, along with interests in administrability (vs. eq ui ta ble flex i bil ity), and sys tem main tenance interests, such as that in the pres er va tion of the sep a ra tion of powers. Or all of the above.
For H/K, it is im por tant that pol icy anal y sis uses con sid er ations that are dis cre tion ary or leg is la tive. But for our pur poses, what counts is not how pol icy anal y sis is done, but how the sit u a tion is framed as one in which it is pos si ble, or re quired. In other words, be fore the pol icy anal ysis be gins, what ever its con tent, the in ter preter ex plic itly or im plic itly frames the sit u a tion as one in which there is a con flict or a gap that ex -empts him from the el e men tary duty to ap ply a clear norm when the facts clearly fit within its def i ni tions. This ini tial fram ing is not the o rized by the au thors who de vel oped pol icy anal y sis.
This pa per asks how we can un der stand the fram ing of a prob lem of in ter pre ta tion, that is the pro cess by which the in ter preter con sti tutes the sit u a tion in ei ther of two ways: ei ther as one in which all that is re quired is ap pli ca tion of a norm, or as one in which, be cause we are in the penum bra or within the Kelsenian frame, or there is a con flict or a gap, something more than mere ap pli ca tion of a norm is re quired (the "something more" be ing choice among el i gi ble in ter pre ta tions based on leg isla tive dis cre tion, co her ence anal y sis, or pol icy anal y sis). The ital i cized words are meant to in di cate the points of de par ture from posi tiv ist and post-positivist the o ries of in ter pre ta tion. There are two as pects to our inquiry. The first is as to the pro cess by which the in ter preter de cides what norm or norms to in ter pret in a given case. The sec ond is as to the pro cess by which the in ter preter de cides that the facts of the case lo cate it in the core or the pen um bra, out side or within the Kelsenian frame, or that there is a con flict of ar gu ably ap pli ca ble rules or a gap.
In the Hart/Kelsen frame work, shared by con cep tual ju ris pru dence and pol icy anal y sis, there is no room for the ac tiv ity that I would place at the cen ter of a phe nom en ol ogy of cores, frames, gaps and con flicts, a phe nom en ol ogy that can ac count for de ter mi nacy and in de ter mi nacy. This is the ac tiv ity of le gal "work" un der stood as the trans for ma tion of an ini tial ap pre hen sion (Husserl) of what the le gal ma te ri als mak ing up the sys tem re quire, by an ac tor who is pur su ing a goal or a vi sion of what they should re quire. (The con cep tion of work here is in spired by Marx's Eco nomic and Philo soph i cal Manu scripts of 1844-1845.) Le gal work, as I am us ing the term, whether aimed at cores or frames or at pen um bras or con flicts or gaps, is un der taken "stra te gi cally". The worker aims to trans form an ini tial ap pre hen sion of what the sys tem of norms requires, given the facts, so that a new ap pre hen sion of the system, as it ap plies to the case, will cor re spond to the ex tra-ju ris tic prefer ences of the in ter pre tive worker.
Le gal work oc curs af ter the ini tial ap pre hen sion of facts and norm, and af ter "unself-con scious rule ap pli ca tion". The in ter preter "grasps" (a ges talt pro cess, as in Kohler's Ges talt Psy chol ogy) the sit u a tion as a whole as one in which a norm gov erns and the ques tion is whether partic u lar facts within the sit u a tion trig ger its ap pli ca tion so as to pro duce a sanc tion. Some one has died, and the court is ask ing, first, whether the de fen dant killed a per son, and, sec ond, whether the kill ing was a le gal mur der, and that "de pends on the facts". Of ten, once the facts are found, no one will even ad vert to the pos si bil ity of le gal work di rected at the inter pre ta tion of the norm that de fines and pun ishes mur der. The facts will be un derstood to es tab lish guilt or in no cence "of their own ac cord", as the "norm ap plies it self" seem ingly with out any agency of the interpreter.
It is fa mil iar that the facts come into le gal be ing through the work of in ves ti ga tors, so that the facts pre sented de pend on the work strat e gies and lev els of ef fort of pros e cu tors and par ties. It is also fa mil iar that the ad vo cates and the judge, and, at a more ab stract level, the ju rist, sometimes work to trans form the ini tial ap pre hen sion of which norm gov erns and what it re quires. This is "stra te gic be hav ior in in ter pre ta tion".
These are three types of stra te gic be hav ior in in ter pre ta tion: First, try ing to find le gal ar gu ments that will pro duce the ef fect of legal de ter mi nacy for a rule dif fer ent from the one that ini tially ap peared self ev i dently to gov ern the case, as for ex am ple by mak ing it ap pear that there is nec es sar ily an ex cep tion to the rule that cov ers the case, or that the case is cov ered by a dif fer ent rule al to gether.
Sec ond, try ing to make what looked like a self ev i dently dis cre tion ary ju di cial de ci sion (one in the pe riph ery or within the frame) ap pear to be one in which there is, af ter all and coun ter-in tu itively, a par tic u lar rule whose ap pli ca tion is re quired by the ma te ri als (i. e. the case falls within the core or all al ter na tives are out side the frame).
Third, try ing to dis place an ini tially self-ev i dently "valid" or le gally re quired rule with a per cep tion of the sit u a tion as one in which the judge is obliged to choose ac cord ing to vague cri te ria be tween le gally per missi ble al ter na tive (i. e. mov ing an in ter pre ta tion from the core to the periph ery or into a frame per mit ting ju di cial dis cre tion).
In all these cases, the in ter preter works to cre ate or to undo de ter minacy, rather than sim ply reg is ter ing or ex pe ri enc ing it as a given of the sit u a tion.
Work pre sup poses a me dium, some thing that the worker "fash ions". In this case, the me dium is that body of le gal ma te ri als which are con sidered rel e vant in es tab lish ing the mean ing of the norm. This will certainly in clude the dic tio nary, with its def i ni tions, and the le gal dic tio nary with its quite dif fer ent ones, and doc trinal com men tary, and the full body of valid le gal norms, per haps leg is la tive de bates, per haps case law.
From our point of view, the ques tion is not what count, of fi cially, as "sources", but what el e ments are sought out and de ployed in fact in the work of ad vo cacy or jus ti fi ca tion.
The worker works uses the le gal ma te ri als to con vince an au di ence of some kind (and him self as well) that an ini tial ap pre hen sion (his or that of an other) of de ter mi nacy or in de ter mi nacy was wrong. But there is noth ing that guar an tees that this en ter prise will suc ceed. Work is nei ther cog ni tion of bind ing law nor dis cre tion in de vis ing law ac cord ing to "leg is la tive pref er ence". It is be tween these two. The le gal ma te ri als constrain le gal work but the way a me dium con strains any other worker. It con strains only against an ef fort to make the ma te ri als mean one thing or an other.
To say that the in ter pre ta tion of the rule was de ter mi nate is only to say that at the end of the work pro cess the in ter preter was un able to accom plish the stra te gi cally de sired re-in ter pre ta tion of the ini tially self-ev i dent mean ing of the norm. In other words, crit i cal le gal stud ies, as I un der stand it, ac cepts fully the posi tiv ist idea that law is some times de ter mi nate and some times in de ter mi nate. Cls re jects both the idea of global in de ter mi nacy and the idea that there is al ways a cor rect in ter preta tion, how ever ob scure or dif fi cult to ar rive at. But it also re jects the idea that de ter mi nacy and in de ter mi nacy are "qual i ties" or "at trib utes" in her ent in the norm, in de pend ently of the work of the in ter preter.
Stra te gic suc cess against ini tially self-ev i dent de ter mi nacy (or self-evi dent in de ter mi nacy) is a func tion of time, strat egy, skill, and of the "intrin sic" or es sen tial or "ob jec tive" or "real" at trib utes of the rule that one is try ing to change. The "on to log i cal" ques tion is whether it is ap pro priate to re gard the de ter mi nacy of the rule, mean ing it's in su per a bly binding or "valid" qual ity at the end of the pe riod al lowed for work ing on it, as its own at trib ute, some thing in her ent to it. The al ter na tive is that the de ter mi nate or in de ter mi nate qual ity of the rule can not be un der stood otherwise than as an "ef fect"-the "ef fect of ne ces sity"-pro duced contingently by the in ter ac tion of the in ter preter's time, strat egy and skill with an un know able "be ing in it self" or "es sen tial" na ture of the rule.
The le gal worker per forms the clas sic phenomenological re duc tion or "brack et ing" [epoche] (Husserl) of the ques tion of whether the re sis tance of the rule to re in ter pre ta tion is a re sult of what it "re ally" is or merely an ef fect of time, strat egy and skill. The worker pro ceeds by try ing to change things, with out a pre-com mit ment one way or an other to an on -tol ogy of the norm. For the stra te gic in ter preter noth ing turns on de ciding on the es sence. The left phenomenological po si tion within Cls adopts this at ti tude as well.
Stakes de ter mine how much work to do. Max Weber's dis tinc tion between ma te rial and ideal stakes is use ful here. The lit i gants may be ma teri ally mo ti vated, and the judge too, but judges (and ju rists) are ob vi ously often con scious of only ideal stakes. They choose a work strat egy because they un der stand their en ter prise as hav ing to do with "justice", un der stood as non-iden ti cal with law ap pli ca tion. They also un der stand the duty to achieve jus tice as "sub or di nate" to law. But this duty can be op er a tive only af ter law is es tab lished. The con ven tional def i ni tion of the ju di cial (or ju ris tic) role does n't say any thing about le gal work, because the stan dard (posi tiv ist) model rec og nizes only cog ni tion and dis cre tion, and makes no place for work.
Those who un der stand in ter pre ta tion as ei ther cog ni tive or dis cre tionary are likely to re gard work de signed to achieve a par tic u lar change in the self ev i dent mean ing of a norm, in a di rec tion that is de ter mined strategically, that is, ex tra-ju ris ti cally, as il le git i mate. I think the il le git imacy ar gu ment is in cor rect.
First, most peo ple agree that judges are sup posed to work at in ter preta tion, and have to de cide how to ori ent their work. In deed, most ju rists would re gard it as a vi o la tion of the du ties of the ju di cial role for the judge sim ply to act on what ever mean ing of the norm was ini tially self-ev i dent, once it has been pointed out that there is an other pos si bility. The rea son for this is that the judge knows that work may change the initial ap pear ance. He can not take it as "true" merely be cause it is ini tially le gally self-ev i dent.
Faced with the ob li ga tion to work in one di rec tion or an other, judges (and ju rists) of ten choose to ori ent their work to the goal of mak ing their ex tra-ju ris tic or leg is la tive in tu ition of jus tice-in-rule-choice into the real ity of ju di cial decision these are the "ac tiv ists", in Unitedstatesean parlance. What Hart and Kelsen re fer to as "leg is la tive" mo tives we all un der stand to fall within the do main of "ide ol ogy". An ide ol ogy is a "uni ver sal iza tion pro ject" as sert ing a con cep tion of jus tice that is controversial, al leged by some to be mere ra tio nal iza tion of non-uni versal interests and by oth ers to be uni ver sal-as well as lead ing to vin di cation of the in ter ests al leged by its op po nents to be merely par tial (Mannheim, Habermas). Judges (and ju rists) some times work not ran -domly in try ing to make law cor re spond to jus tice but ac cord ing to their com mit ment to well known uni ver sal iza tion pro jects or ide ol o gies. This pos ture is prob lem atic be cause even if we readily ac knowl edge that judges are obliged by their role to work to make pos i tive law cor re spond to jus tice, it is a prem ise of the lib eral dem o cratic the ory of the sep a ration pow ers that ide ol ogy is not just "leg is la tive" but that it is not for the ju di ciary (or for the ju rist).
Judges of ten re spond to the di lemma by claim ing to work and attempt ing to work non-ideo log i cally -brack et ing their leg is la tive pref erences in de cid ing in which di rec tion they will try to move frames or cores. But when they do this, they have to con tend with the fact that their audience, and they them selves, un der stand dif fer ent out comes to re spond, in many cases with high stakes, to dif fer ent ide ol o gies. Two very common ju di cial (and ju ris tic) pos tures, in the pres ence of this di lemma, are "bi po lar ity" and "dif fer ence split ting". In the first, the judges es tablishes, for him self and oth ers, that he is an ideo log i cal "neu tral" be cause he un pre dict ably al ter nates be tween the al ter na tives de fined by con flicting ideologies. In the sec ond, the judge es tab lishes his neu tral ity by being a "cen trist", de vis ing a so lu tion that gives some thing to each side, but gives nei ther side all that it de mands. These are bad faith so lu tions, in Sartre's sense in Be ing and Noth ing ness, be cause they avoid role conflict through de nial (in Freud and Anna Freud's sense).
The po si tion of the "ac tiv ist" judge, who con sciously or un consciously pur sues his own ideo log i cal com mit ments (rather than claim ing neu tral ity be cause he is a wild card or a cen trist) seems to me more eth ically plau si ble. The judge knows that work may make the rule ap proach his legislative pref er ence, but may not. Sup pose he is com mit ted to ap plying the rule if he can not destabilize it us ing ac cepted, con ven tional ju di cial tech niques -that is by re search into the le gal ma te ri als that will lead to their re in ter pre ta tion ac cord ing to ac cepted can ons of le gal reasoning.
Then why should n't he di rect his work, time strat egy and skill, to find ing the ar gu ment that will make law cor re spond to his con cep tion of justice? It seems plain, to me, that he would be act ing il le git i mately precisely if he failed to at tempt this, in other words if he failed to make the at tempt to re work pos i tive law to make it cor re spond to his idea of justice. The ju di cial (and the ju ris tic) role re quires fi del ity to "law" in the com plex sense that com bines a pos i tive and an ideal el e ment. This po si tion, which le giti mates ju ris tic work in tended to in flect the law in the judge's (or ju rist's) pre ferred ideo log i cal di rec tion, is, of course, "anarchist" (or at least "plu ral ist") from the "Jac o bin" point of view that locates le gal le git i macy solely in the will of the peo ple.
If we rec og nize that judges can and do work to change cores or frames (whether or not we re gard this work as le git i mate), then a ba sic Hart/Kelsen no tion is un der mined. This is what Kelsen calls the "dy namic con cep tion", in which the move ment of norm cre ation is from the ab stract to the par tic ular or con crete. In Hart, it is the no tion that ad ju di ca tion "fills in" the periphery, as well ex pressed by MacCormick in the fol low ing quo ta tion.
The the sis that even the best drawn laws or li nes lea ve so me pe num bra of doubt, and this calls for an exer ci se of a partly po li ti cal dis cre tion to sett le the doubt, is not par ti cu larly new, it is but the com mon cu rrency of mo dern le gal po si ti vism...
A cru cial point, though, is that one ought not to miss or un der-es ti ma te the signi fi can ce of li ne-dra wing or de ter mi na tio as al ready dis cus sed. The law really does and really can sett le is sues of prio rity bet ween prin ci ples by fi xing ru les, and even when pro blems of in ter pre ting ru les ari se, the se fo cus on mo re na rrowly de fined points of in ter pre ting ru les than if the mat ter we re still at lar ge as one of pu re prin ci ple. Fi xing ru les can be do ne eit her by le gis la tion or by pre ce dent; most com monly, in a mo dern system, by the two in com bi na tion. It is one of the gifts of law to ci vi li za tion that it can sub ject prac ti cal ques tions to mo re na rrowly focus sed forms of ar gu ment than tho se which are avai la ble to un res tric ted prac ti cal rea son.
If stra te gi cally di rected work in in ter pre ta tion can ini tial ap pre hensions of cores or frames, then this state ment is much too op ti mis tic about the "gifts of law to civ i li za tion". In my ex tended treat ment of this topic, I sug gest that "small" ques tions can have very large ideo log i cal stakes. Sec ond, I sug gest that con trary to MacCormick's sug ges tion, the same ar gu ments of prin ci ple re cur at each level of ab strac tion, so that set tling is sues "further down" in the pyr a mid will in volve ar gu ments no less controversial than those that ap ply at the top.
But for my pur poses here, there is a quite dif fer ent point: even af ter an in ter pre ta tion is set tled, work can destabilize it. This means that work can "in flect" or "shift" cores and frames. There is now a "from the bot tom up" dy namic that coun ter acts to one ex tent or an other Hart and Kelsen's top down, ab stract to con crete, dy namic. Rather than MacCormick's progressively nar rower fo cus for is sues of con tro versy, the worker can hope to split open cores or dis solve them.
So work does more than fill the frame or the pe riph ery dy nam i cally with stra te gi cally de ter mined norm choices. Ide ol ogy in flects work which in flects frames and cores, which in turn pro vide, in the co her ence view, means to fur ther destabilizations of other cores and frames.
In this view, the body of valid law, that is law that is re garded by le gal work ers in their ini tial en coun ter with the ma te ri als as core or frames, is best un der stood, first, as an his tor i cal work prod uct of law yers, ju rists and judges pur su ing con flict ing ideo log i cal pro jects (which may be centrist, in the above sense), and, sec ond, as al ways but un pre dict ably subject to destabilization by fu ture ideo log i cally ori ented work strat e gies.
II
In or der to un der stand how the above po si tion, rep re sent ing one, possi bly the dom i nant po si tion within crit i cal le gal stud ies since about 1985, and, to day, the only re main ing ex plic itly ar gued Cls po si tion, it may be use ful to con trast it with a typ i cal mis read ing of Cls from within the main stream of An glo-Amer i can le gal phi los o phy, in this case by my friend Brian Bix:
[I]n par ti cu lar, Cls theo rists ar gued for the ra di cal in de ter mi nacy of law: the ar gument that le gal ma te rials do not de ter mi ne the out co me of par ti cu lar ca ses. Cls theo rists ge ne rally ac cep ted that the out co mes of most ca ses we re pre dic ta ble; but this was, they clai med, not be cau se of the de ter mi nacy of the law, but rat her becau se jud ges had known or pre dic ta ble bia ses. The le gal ma te rials, on their own, we re said to be in de ter mi na te, be cau se lan gua ge was in de ter mi na te, or be cau se legal ru les ten ded to in clu de con tra dic tory prin ci ples which allo wed jud ges to justify wha te ver re sult they cho se (Kel man 1987). The Cls cri ti ques ha ve ge ne rally been held to be overs ta ted (So lum 1987) ; though the re may well be ca ses for which the le gal ma te rials do not gi ve a clear re sult, or at least not a re sult on which everyo ne could im me dia tely agree, this ne ga tes neit her the ea si ness of the vast majority of pos si ble dis pu tes nor the pos si bi lity of right ans wers even for the har der ca ses. The Oxford Hand book of Le gal Stu dies, Pe ter Ca ne and Mark Tush net, eds., p. 983.
1. The left-phenomenological Cls ten dency (ar gu ably the dom i nant ten dency) ar gued that the le gal ma te ri als do or do not de ter mine the outcomes of cases only in in ter ac tion with the ar gu men ta tive strat e gies of ju rists purs ing ob jec tives with lim ited time and re sources. The ma te ri als are one part of the de ter mi na tion, but only in com bi na tion with in ter pretive ac tiv ity which is not cog ni tive but rather con sciously or un consciously stra te gic. It is not and never was the po si tion of this ten dency within Cls that the le gal ma te ri als "do not de ter mine the out come of particular cases" but rather that their in flu ence is me di ated and that their "in trin sic" or "es sen tial" de ter mi nacy or in de ter mi nacy is un know able.
The le gal ma te ri als are "in de ter mi nate" only in the sense that sometimes it is pos si ble to destabilize ini tial ap pre hen sions through le gal work-"in trin si cally" or "es sen tially" they are nei ther de ter mi nate nor inde ter mi nate. True, we of ten ini tially ap pre hend them as de ter min ing the outcome of a par tic u lar case or, on the con trary, as not de ter min ing the out come (be cause the case falls in the pe riph ery or within the frame, for a H/K per son, or within the ar eas of in de ter mi nacy of con cep tual analysis or pol icy anal y sis for ad vo cates of those meth ods). On this basis, we can pre dict re sults when we an tic i pate that no work will be done to destabilize the ini tial ap pre hen sion. And it will of ten be pos si ble to pre dict that no such work will be done be cause the ex tant ideo log i cal pro jects empowered through the ju di ciary are in agree ment with the initial apprehension -in other words be cause ac tors with rad i cal or outly ing ideo log i cal pro jects do not work as judges or as in flu en tial ju rists.
In a sec ond mo ment, the le gal ma te ri als are de ter mi nate in those cases where af ter le gal work to the point of ex haust ing the time and re sources avail able, the in ter preter finds him self or her self un able to destabilize the intial ap pre hen sion that there is an ap pli ca ble norm and that that norm de cides the case for one party or an other. On this ba sis, we can pre dict re sults when we an tic i pate that the work done to destabilize out comes will fail. In this case, we are mak ing a pre dic tion about the out come of the in ter ac tion be tween in ter pre tive work and the un know able "es sence" of the ma te ri als. Again, the cen trist ide ol o gies shared by judges and ju rists in cap i tal ist coun tries are an im por tant fac tor in this kind of pre dic tion.
CLS writ ers have worked from the be gin ning and con tin u ally, to figure out how rules that seemed likely to re sist even the most sus tained effort at trans for ma tion through in ter pre ta tion, given the mod er ate left or mod er ate right ideo log i cal pref er ences shared by vir tu ally all judges in all cap i tal ist coun tries, have mas sive and un just im pacts on op pressed groups. This is the Cls con tri bu tion to the so ci ol ogy of law and left wing law and eco nom ics.
2. The no tion that the in de ter mi nacy of lan guage ex plained the way in which law is in de ter mi nate has had some in flu ence in Cls, par tic u larly on the early work of Unger, and on writ ers like Boyle, who pur ported to speak for Cls as a whole. From the be gin ning, a more in flu en tial cur rent ar gued that rules vary in "for mal realizability," or "administrability", so that the sim ple lin guis tic cri tique is of ten triv ial, as are all other ar guments for "global" in de ter mi nacy.
Bix's at tri bu tion to Cls of a no tion that "le gal rules [tend] to con tain con flict ing prin ci ples" is puz zling. The Cls claim was, a la Dworkin, that prin ci ples, pol i cies and rights, and in deed world views, are all part of the com monly de ployed sources of law, but, con tra Dworkin, that they are in in erad i ca ble con flict, within each of us as well as be tween us. Their conflictual pres ence is re flected in the more con crete "valid le gal norms of the sys tem," which Cls, fol low ing le gal re al ism, un der stands to be, al ways, com plex com pro mises of those con flicts. Be cause the rules are com pro mises, rather than a co her ent work ing out of one or an other over-arch ing prin ci ple, they are much more open to destabilizations of var i ous kinds than coherentist writ ers ac knowl edge.
3. The "bi ases" of judges are rel e vant be cause they ori ent le gal work by judges (and other ju rists) to trans form ini tial ap pre hen sions of what the ma te ri als re quire in the par tic u lar di rec tion sug gested by the judges ma te rial or ideal in ter ests (loosely, the judge's or ju rist's ide ol ogy). Whether the ju rist will suc ceed in the work of mak ing the ma te ri als conform to his ideo log i cal or ma te rial ex tra-ju ris tic stra te gic mo tive is never know able in ad vance (though as with any un cer tain fu ture event, we can make odds). Ju rists con stantly ac cept in ter pre ta tions ac cord ing to which the pos i tive law is con trary to their view as to what it ought to be.
More over, "bi ases" or ide ol ogy do not de ter mine ju rist's work strat egies in any way more de ter mi nate than the sys tem of le gal norms de termine out comes. Ide ol o gies are in de ter mi nate in just the way that the legal or der is. There is an her me neu tic cir cle at work here, in which the indeterminacies of each level get re solved by ap peal to a deeper level with its own indeterminacies, and so on, back to the start ing point, in which le gal ideas in flu ence ide ol ogy as well as vice versa.
4. The Cls cri tiques have been held to be over stated (or to in di cate men tal in com pe tence or in san ity) within a main stream that has mis under stood them more or less in the man ner of Brian Bix in the above pas -sage, al though they are quite of ten mis in ter preted, not as above, but as claim ing "de ter mi na tion in the fi nal in stance" by the base, or as a vul gar Marx ist claim that the judges are the "ex ec u tive com mit tee of the rul ing class," and pro ceed case by case to fur ther "the in ter ests of cap i tal". The misreadings de rive in part from the more or less com plete ig no rance both of phe nom en ol ogy and of crit i cal so cial the ory among main stream Unitedstatesean le gal the o rists, in part from the lim ited re sources that main stream le gal phi los o phers de vote to mar ginal cur rents (Bix is ex ceptional in his fa mil iar ity with Cls writ ing), and in part to the nor mal in vestment of main streams in re pro duc ing the mar gin al ity of the margins.
5. Ev ery one knows that "there are cases for which the le gal ma te ri als do not give a clear re sult". And that there are cases in which the le gal ma te ri als do not give a re sult "on which ev ery one could im me di ately agree". The Cls claim is that the ques tion of what pro por tion of ac tual or imag in able cases have de ter mi nate out comes, given the le gal ma te ri als, has to be asked tak ing into ac count the pos si bil ity that le gal work will desta bi lize the ini tial ap pre hen sion of what the ma te ri als re quire. Once we take into ac count that de ter mi nacy is a func tion not just of the words of valid norms and the con tent of other sources, but of an in ter ac tion-between the re sources and strat e gies of who ever has the power to do le gal in ter pre ta tion, and the "thingness" of the ma te ri als-state ments about the "vast ma jor ity of dis putes" are sim ply mean ing less.
6. That re sults are not de ter mi nate in some cases, ac cord ing to Bix, does not "ne gate the... pos si bil ity of right an swers even for the harder cases." The only in tel li gi ble mean ing of a "right an swer" in a case, hard or easy, given the phe nom en ol ogy above, is that hav ing worked with the time and re sources avail able and ac cord ing to a cho sen strat egy, the inter preter can't find an al ter na tive to some par tic u lar ap pre hen sion of what rule ap plies and what it re quires when ap plied. In other words, after per form ing the phenomenological re duc tion, the "right an swer" is the one that is pro duced by an ar gu ment hav ing the "ef fect of ne ces sity". As to whether there is a right an swer in the sense of one avail able to cognition, Cls. takes the po si tion of Kant as to the "thing in it self".
